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1. The theory of expectations 
 
  Economists  have  long 
recognized  that  expectations  play  a 
prominent  role  in  economic  decision 
making  and  are  a  critical  feature  of 
macroeconomic  models.  However,  they 
disagree  about  the  basis  on  which 
individuals  form  expectations  and  thus 
about  the  way  to  model  them.  For 
example,  the  conventional  view  is  that 
current  consumption  spending  depends 
partly on how large or small consumers 
expect  their  future  income  to  be.  But 
economists are not in accord over exactly 
what  information  consumers  take  into 
account in forecasting future income. 
  The  debate  continues,  partly 
because  obtaining  data  on  expectations 
is  difficult.  For  example,  surveys  of 
expectations  are  limited  to  a  few 
economic  variables,  such  as  inflation, 
and  it  is  unclear  whether  the  surveys 
accurately measure the expectations that 
influence  actual  decisions.  In  some 
instances,  expectations  can  be  inferred 
from  non-survey  data.  Expectations 
about future short-term interest rates, for 
example,  can  be  inferred  by  comparing 
the  yields  on  bonds  of  different 
maturities,  given  the  assumption  that  a 
bond‟s yield depends on the sequence of 
short-term  interest  rates  expected  over 
its term to maturity, plus a term premium.  
  However, this approach provides 
accurate measures of expectations only if 
this  theory  of  the  term  structure  of 
interest rates is itself correct and if term 
premiums can be reliably estimated. 
  The  lack  of  adequate  data  has 
meant  that  builders  of  macroeconomic 
models have had to specify a priori how 
individuals  form  expectations  (box  1 
„„Assumptions about the Ways in Which 
Expectations Are Formed‟‟). Most models 
developed  in  the  1960s  and  1970s, 
incorporated  the  simplifying  assumption 
that people form expectations adaptively. 
Under this assumption, for example, the 
expectation for inflation in the next year is 
based  on  the  recent  inflation  trend. 
Similarly, expected interest rates depend 
on past interest rates. 
  Starting in the 1970s, a number 
of  economists  strongly  criticized  this 
treatment  of  expectations  in 
macroeconomic models. Robert Lucas, in 
what has become known as the „„Lucas 
Critique,‟‟  argued  that  analyzing 
alternative  monetary  and  fiscal  policies 
using  these  models  is  of  questionable 
value  because  the  adaptive  approach 
fails to recognize that, in the real world, 
people  are  likely  to  modify  their 
expectations  as  policies  are  changed. 
  According  to  Lucas  (1976)  and 
others,  individuals  have  economic 
incentives  to  form  accurate  forecasts  of 
future  economic  events,  and  such 
forecasts  include  the  anticipated  effects 
of  the  government‟s  macroeconomic 
policies.  If  the  Federal  Reserve  usually 
lowers  interest  rates  during  recessions, 
for  example,  then  individuals  facing  the 
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onset  of  a  recession  will  base  their 
forecasts  of  future  interest  rates  on  the 
systematic  relationship  between  the 
cyclical state of the economy and interest 
rates. 
  Because  of  the  criticism  of 
adaptive expectations, the assumption of 
rational  expectations,  which  had  first 
been proposed in the early 1960s, gained 
favor among many macroeconomists. In 
a  given  macroeconomic  model, 
expectations of future events are rational 
if  they  are  identical  to  the  forecasts  of 
that  model.  Because  it  posits  that 
individuals  make  full  use  of  all  of  the 
information embodied in the structure of 
a  macroeconomic  model,  the  rational 
expectations approach has become one 
benchmark  for  the  estimation  of 
unobserved expectations. 
  Cost–benefit analysis provides a 
useful perspective on this debate. In the 
view  represented  by  models  employing 
adaptive expectations, either the costs of 
sophisticated  approaches  to  forming 
expectations  are  high,  or  the  benefits 
from  improved  forecast  accuracy  are 
slight.  Thus,  individuals  form  their 
expectations  of  the  future  using  simple 
rules  of  thumb  or  easily  computed 
formulas, such as adaptive expectations. 
At  the  other  extreme  is  the  view 
underlying  the  rational  expectations 
approach.  In  this  case,  collecting  and 
analyzing information is assumed to have 
small  costs  and  large  benefits,  and 
consequently  individuals  base 
expectations on sophisticated forecasting 
models  that  make  use  of  all  relevant 
data. 
  Between  these  extremes  is  the 
view that forecasting has both significant 
advantages and significant costs. Such a 
circumstance  should  lead  households 
and  firms  to  choose  forecasting  models 
that  closely  resemble  their  economic 
environment but fall short of a complete 
model of the economy in every detail. In 
FRB/US  model,  one  of  the  options  for 
expectations  formation,  referred  to  as 
VAR  expectations,  is  motivated  by  this 
view. 
 
2. Role of expectations 
 
  Recent  contributions  in  the 
literature  have  enhanced  our 
understanding  of  the  finner  monetary 
policy  details  and  advanced  technology 
has  allowed  us  to  formalise  the  paths 
through  which  expectations  afect 
inflation. The design and implementation 
of  monetary  policy  have  been  clear 
beneficiaries  of  these  advancements. 
  The  role  of  expectations  in  the 
economy has been the spring board for 
the extensive rules (commitment) versus 
discretion  discussion.  It  has  been 
advocated therefore, that a Central Bank 
that announces the rules based on which 
it  decides  its  actions,  commits  to  a 





































Expectations,  the  argument  
goes,  are  then  tied  to  that  level  of 
inflation  that  is  consistent  with  the  rule 
followed.  This,  as  has  been  shown 
extensively in the literature, can produce 
superior  results  in  terms  of  society‟s 
welfare.  The  difficulty  with  such  an 
approach however, is that it might suffer 
from the problem of time-inconsistency in 
the  sense  that,  as  it  is  impossible  to 
predict  all  likely  outcomes  that  could 
happen  in  advance,  committing  oneself 
to a specific operational rule runs the risk 
of never being applied. Discretion, on the 
other  hand,  allows  all  the  flexibility  that 
events warrant, but then at the cost of not 
necessarily helping expectations move in 
the  desirable  direction.  The  merits  of 
commitment  therefore,  pull  against  the 
time-consistency  of  discretion.  Central 
Banks  themselves,  although  always  in 
favor  of  reaping  the  benefits  of  having 
committed,  worry  about  the  fact  that  in 
real time, it is not always easy to assume 
that they are in such a position. 
  In  actual  decision  making 
therefore,  they  need  to  allow  for  the 
possibility  that  private  sector 
expectations  are  not  the  result  of  past 
pre-committing  policies,  but  are  instead 
updated beliefs based on the information 
the private sector has at any given point 
in  time.  To  allow  for  this  worry,  we  will 
consider  a  discretionary  set-up  in  the 
sections  that  follow,  and  thus  separate 
the formation of expectations from actual 
policy making. 
  What becomes important then, is 
to  know  how  these  expectations  are 
formed  and  what  authorities  can  do  to 
address  resulting  inefficiencies.  The 
timing  of  the  game  assumed  will 
therefore,  have  shocks  occur  first,  then 
private  agents  form  expectations  based 
on  information  available  about  these 
shocks and policy objectives, and finnally 
the central banks forms policy. 
  Regarding  the  coordinations  of 
the monetary policy, in our opinion, it is 
very  interesting  to  debate  if  the  central 
bank  must  publish  it‟s  own  forecast  for 
the  monetary  policy  interest  rates.  This 
problem recently came to the fore of the 
debate  following  the  decision  of 
Sweden‟s central bank, the Riksbank, in 
2006 to join the central bank of Norway 
and  New  Zeeland,  in  publishing  the 
forecast  of  its  policy  rate.  Even  among 
Box 1 Assumption in which expectations are formed 
 
Macroeconomic  models  have  relied  on  several  different  assumptions  about  how 
individuals form expectations of future economic conditions: 
 
Adaptive expectations depend only on past observations of the variable in question. 
Most econometric models developed in the 1960s and 1970s, including the MPS 
model, employed this assumption. 
 
Rational, or model-consistent, expectations are identical to the forecasts produced by 
the macroeconomic model in which the expectations are used. This assumption has 
been used in many macroeconomic models developed in the past fifteen years and is 
one option for the formation of expectations used in FRB/US. 
 
VAR expectations are identical to the forecasts of a small vector autoregression (VAR) 
model that includes equations for a few key economic measures. This is another option 
for expectations formation used in FRB/US. 
 
Adaptive and VAR expectations may be rational if they are used in a macroeconomic 
model with a coinciding structure. For example, if actual inflation depends only on past 
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those  central  banks  that  have  explicit 
inflation  targeting  policy  regime,  the 
practice of publishing the forecast of the 
policy  rate  puts  these  three  countries 
(New Zeeland, Norway and Sweden) and 
the vanguard at the trend towards greater 
central  bank  disclosure.  Another‟s 
inflation – targeting central bank, Bank of 
England,  has  been  less  willing  to  go 
down this route. 
  The Bank of England position is 
at  odds  with  a  body  of  work  in  the 
academia  and  policy  circles  that  has 
advocated forward – looking guidance by 
the central bank on its future actions as a 
way  to  enhance  effectiveness  of 
monetary  policy.  The  argument  starts 
with the observation that the central bank 
generally  controls  directly  only  the 
overnight interest rate. The links from the 
overnight interest rate – the direct level of 
monetary  policy  –  to  the  prices  that 
matter, such as long term interest rates, 
depend  almost  entirely  on  market 
expectation,  and  monetary  policy  is 
effective  only  to  the  extent  that  the 
central bank can shape the beliefs of the 
market participants. 
  A second plank in the argument 
for  the  central  bank  providing  guidance 
on  its  future  actions  is  some  version  of 
expectation theory of the yield curve – in 
other words, that long term interest rates 
are  determined  by  market  participant 
expectation‟s of the future course of short 
term  rates  set  by  the  central  bank.  By 
charting a path for future short rates and 
communicating  this  path  clearly  to  the 
market, the central bank can, it is argued, 
influence  market  expectations,  thereby 
affecting  mortgage  rates,  corporate 
lending rates and other prices that have a 
direct  impact  on  the  economy.  Having 
thus  gain  a  lever  of  control  over  long-
term  rates,  monetary  policy  works 
through  the  IS  (investment  –  savings) 
curve  through  quantities  such  as 
consumption and investment. 
  Indeed,  as  many  commented, 
the management of expectations is seen 
by many leading monetary economists of 
the  expectationalist school and the task 
of monetary policy. For Svensson (1999, 
p. 1) “monetary policy is to a large extent 
the management of expectations”, or as 
Woodward  (2005,  p.  3)  has  put  it  “not 
only do expectations about policy matter, 
but,  at  least  under  current  conditions, 
very  little  else  matters”.  The  arguments 
are laid out particularly clearly in a policy 
speech  given  by  The  Federal  Reserve 
Governor, Ben Bernanke (2004), entitled 
The  logic  of  monetary  policy.  In  this 
paper,  Bernanke  explores  the  analogy 
between  driving  a  car  and  steering  the 
economy  through  the  monetary  policy. 
The economy is a car, The Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) is the driver, 
and monetary policy actions are akin to 
taps  on  the  accelerator  or  the  brake  in 
order to stimulate and cool the economy 
as  appropriate,  based  on  its  current 
state.  Bernanke  notes  that  while  this 
analogy  is  superficially  attractive,  the 
analogy  breaks  down  due  to  the 
importance  of  expectations  of  future 
actions  by  the  central  bank.  If  the 
economy  is  like  a  car,  then  it  is  a  car 
whose  speed  at  a  particular  moment 
depends  not  on  the  pressure  on  the 
accelerator at that moment, but rather on 
the  expected  average  pressure  on  the 
accelerator over the rest of the trip. 
  In  addition  to  the  argument  that 
monetary  policy  is  more  effective  when 
central  banks  disclose  the  path  of  their 
future  policy  rates,  there  is  also  an 
argument  that  appeals  to  consistency. 
Rudenbusch  and  Williams  (2006) 
examine  the  current  practice  of  some 
inflation  –  targeting  central  banks  at 
arriving  of  forecasts  of  inflation  and 
output  that  are  based  either  on  the 
assumption  that  the  policy  rate  will 
remain constant, going forward, or on the 
path of the policy rate as revealed on the 
market prices of short – term interest rate 
futures  contracts.  If  the  central  bank 
knows that its own forecast diverges from 
either  or  both  these  paths,  then  the 
central  bank‟s  own  forecast  of  inflation 
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Thus,  in  addition  to  the  reasons  arising 
from policy effectiveness, even from the 
viewpoint  of  consistency,  the  disclosure 
of future expected policy actions is seen 
as being desirable. 
 
3. Expectation theory of the yield 
curve 
 
  As  we  have  already  seen,  the 
most important plank in the argument for 
the desirability of publishing guidance on 
the  future  path  of  central  bank  policy 
rates is some version of the expectations 
theory  of  the  yield  curve.  According  to 
this  theory,  long-term  interest  rates  are 
determined  by  the  expectations  of  the 
future  path  of  short-term  rates.  It  is 
through this channel that the central bank 
gains a lever over prices that matter – in 
particular long-term rates that determine 
the  key  interest  rates  that  determine 
mortgage  rates,  corporate  lending  rates 
and so on. While there is some empirical 
support for the expectations theory of the 
yield  curve,  the  evidence  is  mixed. 
Gerlach  and  Smets  (1995)  find 
supporting evidence for the expectations 
theory  for  a  number  of  European 
countries, but there is little evidence for it 
for countries that host the major financial 
markets. 
  Indeed, in a paper published 25 
years  ago,  Shiller  at  al.  (1983,  p.  174-
175)  summarize  the  state  of  discussion 
on  the  expectations  theory  in  the 
following  unflattering  terms:  “the  simple 
expectations theory, in combination with 
the  hypothesis  of  rational  expectations, 
has been rejected many times in careful 
econometric  studies.  But  the  theory 
seems  to  reappear  perennially  in  policy 
discussions as if nothing had happened 
to  it.  It  is  uncanny  how  resistant 
superficially  appealing  theories  in 
economics are to contrary evidence. We 
are  reminded  Tom  and  Jerry  cartoons 
that  precede  feature  films  at  movie 
theatres. The villain, Tom the cat, may be 
buried  under  a  ton  of  boulders,  blasted 
through  a  brick  of  wall  (leaving  a  cat-
shaped  hole)  or  flattened  by  a 
steamroller.  Yet seconds later, he  is up 
again plotting his evil deeds”. 
  When  considering  the  workings 
of financial markets and the motivation of 
traders, the failure of expectation theory 
of  the  yield  curve  is  perhaps  not  a 
surprise. Although it is very plausible that 
central bank guidance is the pivotal factor 
in pricing out one or two years in the yield 
curve,  it  seems  more  of  a  stretch  to 
believe  that  that  longer-term  rates  are 
determined  by  traders‟  expectations  of 
central bank actions in the distant future. 
When  hedge  funds  and  fixed-income 
traders  trade  ten-year  swaps,  could  be 
plausible believe that they are influenced 
primarily by their beliefs of central bank 
policy  seven,  eight  or  nine  years  from 
today? Evidence from the markets tends 
to undermine such a hypothesis. 
  Even among those central banks 
that have begun the publish the forecast 
of  their  future  policy  rates,  the  markets 
have not always taken the cue from the 
central bank‟s forecast in setting prices. 
Goodhart  (2007)  notes  that  when  the 
Norges  Bank  (Norway‟s  central  bank) 
published  its  interest  rate  projections  in 
autumn  2006,  very  short-term  rates  fell 
into line but the longer ones did not. The 
expectations  theory  of  the  yield  curve 
seems  even  less  secure  in  the  face  of 
such evidence. 
 
4. The compliance between 
intersubjective and rational 
expectations 
 
  There  is  an  extreme  important 
point to be drawn  out  of the discussion 
for  the  institutional  and  constructivist 
analyses  of  applications  of  rational 
expectations  theory  in  economic  and 
monetary affairs. More precisely, it is that 
intersubjective  expectations  rather  than 
rational  expectations  per  se  generate 
stable,  predictable,  and  cooperative 
outcomes  between  market  actors  and 
those  who  seek  to  affect  market 
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  As  Mark  Blyth  has  already 
pointed  out,  Keynes  understood,  and 
some  (particularly  theorists  of  rational 
expectations)  have  chosen  to  forget, 
market  actors  are  non-rational  and 
myopic as often as they are rational and 
calculating. They look to one another for 
signals  to  inform  their  own  market 
transactions (Blyth, 2003). Markets react 
adversely against information and signals 
(such as signals from the central bank) if 
the information or signals are contrary to 
the  conventional  expectations  of market 
actors.  In  this  context:”  conventions  are 
intersubjective understandings shared by 
market  actors  that  specify  how  markets 
are  supposed  to  behave…they  are 
sociological  constructs….  Market 
behavior  therefore  rests  on  the 
coordination  of  agents,  expectations 
through the maintenance of conventions. 
So  long  as  intersubjectively  held 
conventions  regarding  the  economy  are 
adhered  to,  then  the  economy  will 
perform  within  the  parameters  of  the 
expected conventional judgment. In sum 
there is no truth about markets out there 
apart from the prevailing wisdom markets 
have  about  themselves”  (Blyth,  2003  p. 
257). 
  Thus  not  only  are  the 
expectations  that  coordinate  market 
behavior  based  upon  intersubjectively 
shared social understandings, rather than 
rational  expectations,  these 
intersubjective  expectations  have 
constitutive  effects,  per  Alexander 
Wendt‟s  (1992).  Wendt  distinguishes 
constitutive  from  causal  effects  and 
argues  that  “ideas  or  social  structure 
have  constitutive  effects  when  they 
create phenomena – properties, powers, 
disproportion,  meaning  –  that  are 
conceptually  or  logically  dependent  on 
those ideas or structures that exists only 
in  the  virtue  of  them”.  Because  market 
actors  so  often  act  on  the  basis  of  the 
“truth”  of  their  intersubjectively 
understandings  and  expectations,  what 
the markets believe to be the case on the 
basis of these expectations is indeed the 
case.  Market  stability  then  relies  upon 
intersubjectively  held  conventions,  and 
“change  occurs  when  expectations 
diverge  and  conventions  falter”  (Blyth, 
2003 p. 257). 
  We  see  countless  examples  of 
the  reliance  on  intersubjectively  shared 
cognitive  conventions  in  the  literature 
across  topical  areas  of  economics  to 
explain  how  the  behavior  of  market 
participants  diverges  from  the  behavior 
predicted by rational expectations theory. 
A decade ago, for example, in  an early 
contribution  to  a  now  burgeoning 
literature  on  investor  psychology,  Yale 
economist  Robert  Shiller,  however 
unconsciously,  invoked  intersubjectively 
shared  cognitive  conventions  to  explain 
speculative booms and crashes in quite 
similar  terms:  “now  it  should  be 
recognized  that  if  market  participants 
think  that  investor  psychology  is  the 
cause of stock market movements, then 
that is the view that informs their actions, 
and  then,  indeed,  market  psychology  is 
the  cause  of  stock  price  movements” 
(Shiller, 1996 p. 71). 
  What the markets believe has a 
causal  effect  on  market  behavior.  And 
what  the  markets  believe  can  be  quite 
unrelated  to  their  analyses  of 
fundamentals  of  the  real  economy. 
Markets  participants  rely  the  confidence 
in  intersubjectively  shared  conventional 
understandings  that  the  present  is 
understood  and  the  future  may  be 
predicted.  As  economist  Charles 
Kindleberger  has  suggested,  “a  change 
in  expectations  from  a  state  of 
confidence  to  one lacking confidence in 
the future is central” (Kindleberger, 2000 
p.  91).  This  is  how  asset  bubbles  so 
quickly become panics, crashes or busts. 
A  rising  tide  of  wholly  irrational 
expectations  about  future  rewards  can 
carry along investors, many of whom look 
to  one  another‟s  behavior  for  signals 
rather  than  performing  fundamental 
cost/benefit  or  risk/reward  analyses  of 
their  own  guide  their  investment 
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panic and a crash? Kindleberger answers 
simply  someone  else.  No  great  amount 
of  high-powered,  rational,  technical,  or 
quantitative analysis has been conducted 
by  any  market  actor  to  reverse  market 
fortunes:  “  causa  proxima  is  some 
incident that snaps the confidence of the 
system,  makes  people  think  of  the 
dangers of the failure, and leads them to 
move…back  into  cash.  In  itself,  causa 
proxima  may  be  trivial:  a  bankruptcy,  a 
suicide, a flight, a revelation, an refusal of 
credit to some borrower, some changes 
of views that leads a significant actor to 
unload.  Prices  fall.  Expectations  are 
reversed” (Kindleberger, 2000 p. 100). 
 
5. Conclusions 
   
  The  soundness  of  monetary 
policy decisions is not solely determined 
by their own worth. By implication, policy 
mistakes alone are not always enough to 
produce  long  term  negative  effects  on 
monetary  stability  and  by  the  same 
token, correct decisions do not suffice to 
guarantee  successful  results.  In  both 
cases, what people believe about these 
decisions and subsequent policies, is just 
as  important.  This  point  stems  from 
Phelps‟  contribution  to  the  concept  of 
higher  order  expectations  and  their 
relevance to the final outcome.  
  That  said  then,  Central  Banks 
acquire a dual role: the first is naturally to 
assess the conditions at hand, and make 
as  sound  decisions  as  their  information 
and skills allow; but equally important is 
the second task, which is to inform and 
convince  the  public  about  the  value  of 
their intentions.   
  We  describe  then  monetary 
policy as an information game to capture 
this latter role, and argue that providing a 
clear  inflation  target  helps  agents 
coordinate  at  the  desirable  level.  Issing 
(2002) has been emphatic in pinpointing 
the relevance of such explicit quantitative 
targets  in  monetary  policy 
implementation.  It  is  important  to 
appreciate however, that no regime can 
be  evaluated  in  spite  of  the  economic 
environment it operates in.  
  Our  analysis  shows  that  in  the 
presence  of  unstable  economic 
conditions,  announcing  a  clear  inflation 
target  cannot  be  the  incontestable 
nostrum.  This  is  then  in  line  with 
Goodhart‟s appreciation  of the, at times 
necessary,  lack  of  correspondence 
between monetary theory  and monetary 
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